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ARTICLE

Asian Financial Crisis 1997: An Empirical
Investigation
Khurshid M. Kiani
Bang College of Business, Republic of Kazakhstan
ABSTRACT
Multinomial Asian Financial Crises are said to happen because of financial
mismanagement due to post Bretton Woods era financial liberalization, enhancement
in private sector debt, currency crises, investor panic as well as inept attitude of the
governments in these countries after start of the crises. Since Taiwan is the only
country that was not hit as hard as the other countries in the region due to the brunt
of these crises we decided to analyze its firm structure to unfold the causes of its
survival.
Our analysis reveal evidence that manager operated firms finances their growth
through external finance without taking into account the profitability of the firm.
Contrary to this, the owner operated firms finance their growth from earned profits.
This is a possible explanation of why Taiwan was not affected seriously due to 1997
Asian financial crisis because most Taiwanese firms are operated by owners or
managers who are loyal to the business of the family.
Keywords: owner-controlled firms; management-controlled firms; control type;
financial crisis
JEL Codes: C31, C40, D92;
Word Count- Main Text: 2901

INTRODUCTION
East and South East Asian countries i.e. Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand encountered financial crises from July 1997 to
February 1998. The worst hit among them was Indonesia whose stock market
declined to about more than 80 percent and exchange rate vis-à-vis US dollar fell by
almost 75 percent (Singh 1998). Although the currency crises and stock market
decline was one aspect of the financial crises in these countries, the other aspects that
include macroeconomic imbalances, decline in export growth, decline in property
prices, as well contagion effect and state controlled financial system in these
countries all are reported to be causes of the Asian financial crises.
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Although there are a number of hypotheses that include capital supply shock,
financial liberalization and so forth, there appeared no advance warning of such
crises as international financial institution like World Bank and IMF strongly
commended growth and economic development in these countries. For example, the
World Bank Economist in their research in 1991 entitled “World Development
Report: The Challenge of Development” claimed that East Asian countries were
successful because they followed a market-friendly strategy of development and
integrated their economies closely with that of the world economy assuming that
governments of these countries intervene reluctantly, and if it becomes necessary, it
should be transparent and should be subject to check and balances. However, later
they figured it out that the governments in these countries pursue only export
oriented policies and therefore, in another publication in 1993 entitled “The East
Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy” the World Bank economists
significantly changed their characterization of the East Asian model because of fully
acknowledged enormous government interventions in these economies.
Yilmaz Akyüz (2000) concluded that the 1997 Asian financial crises emerged due to
systemic global financial instability that appeared after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods systems that enhanced liberalization and mobility of international capital
flows. However, some kind of financial mismanagement appeared to be common
among all the East and Southeastern Asian countries that were followed by the inept
attitude of the governments in these countries in implementing timely policy actions.
For example, Thailand, political disarray at various times during 1996-97, including
in the wake of the November 1996 general election, delayed the implementation of
necessary policy measures to avert financial crises in the economy.
There are a number of arguments why 1997 Asian Financial Crises were so different
and unpredictable when compared to financial turmoil experienced in other parts of
the world. Most financial crises in the post-Bretton Woods era are said to happen
because of a combination of currency instability with banking crises, which has
historically been preceded particularly by financial liberalization of the economy.
That is the reason why all episodes of financial crises started by sharp increase in
capital inflows followed by a similar turnaround which caused the world economy to
witness consecutive repeated bouts of financial instability in early 90s i.e. a debt
deflation in the United States and thereafter the crisis in Europe in 1992–1993 which
was followed by the Mexican crisis of 1994–1995 and by the East Asian crisis
beginning in 1997, and thereafter crises in Brazil and in the Russian Federation.
Needless to say that world economy also witnessed repeated bouts of financial crises
in transition economies particularly in Finland because of liberalization of the
financial sector in the economy.
Another argument why financial crises in emerging markets occurred under varying
macroeconomic conditions e.g. current-account deficits, budget deficits and external
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debts. For example crises in Mexico and Thailand occurred when these countries had
large and unsustainable current-account deficits, although in Indonesia and the
Russian Federation such deficits where very small. However, financial crises in
Brazil and the Russian Federation were coupled with large budget deficits and the
debts were owed primarily by the public sector whereas both Mexico and East Asia
had either balanced or surplus budgets and debts were owed primarily by the private
sector. Finally, Brazil, Mexico and the Russian Federation all experienced financial
crises due to currency turmoil that happened in bringing down the inflation but in
most these East Asian countries the appreciation of the currency was moderate or
negligible.
Out of all these episodes of financial crises, the Asian crisis was generally more
difficult to predict than the Mexican, Russian or Brazilian crises. This is important
because these economies had been examples of prudent and sustainable economic
policies. The crisis in East Asia, like crises almost everywhere else, was preceded by
a sharp increase in capital flows to the region. Starting in the early 1990s, there was a
rapid increase in short-term lending by commercial banks to both banks and firms in
the region. Most bank lending was non-syndicated that was directed to non-financial
private firms. Such transactions must have been perceived to be profitable by both
international lenders and the Asian borrowers. However, it turned out that more
capital flowed into these economies than could have been profitably used at modest
risk; i.e. there was a misjudgment of return and risks by both lenders and borrowers.
Pomerleano (1998) noted that there was an excessive investment in these countries
without taking into account poor returns on these investments.
A number of researchers that include Radelet and Sachs (1998), Marshall (1998),
and Chang and Velasco (1999) demonstrate that the Asian crises in 1997 propagated
over time mainly because of sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence
followed by regional contagion. While admitting the worsening of the
macroeconomic performance of some affected countries in the mid-1990s, this view
suggests that the extent and depth of the crisis should not be attributed to
deterioration in fundamentals, but rather to panic on the part of domestic and
international investors. According to this view, fundamental imbalances triggered the
currency and financial crisis in 1997 even after the crisis started; market overreaction
caused the plunge in exchange rates, assets prices, and economic activity more
severe than what one would have expected because of initial weak economic
conditions in these countries.
In the present research, however, we argue that Asian crises and any other crises can
be averted with macroeconomic policy that has microeconomic foundations. As
mentioned in the previous paragraphs, most debts were owed by private sectors and
government policies of intervention were not followed and as such the policy actions
were inept at the start of the crises. We do not argue for financial liberalization nor
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we have a counter proposal on it but we think that there should be some kind of
financial discipline at firm level that should be related to a typical external financing
that might help a situation where excessive financial mobility would be minimized to
support the related macroeconomic policy that could avert a future financial crises
like 1997 Asian Financial Crises. For the same reason, we study conservative
financial firm structure of Taiwanese firms if that was the reason why Taiwan was
not much affected by the 1997 Asian Financial Crises as hard as other countries in
the region did.
RELATED LITERATURE
Despite substantial growth in corporate culture in developed countries especially in
North America, the question whether ownership should be separated from control is
still un-answered although researchers since Berle and Means (1932) have been
trying to explore whether firm ownership should be separated from control because
mangers tend to obviate from profit or present-value maximization of the firms (Lee
1990) and set other goals such as lifetime income (Mosen and Downs 1965), sales
volume (Baumol 1959), growth rate (Marris 1964), or staff expenditure (Williamson
1964). Indeed, managers’ profit-satisficing behavior might be acceptable to some
owners (Colli 2003) who operate family-run and closely-held firms because they
might have additional goals distinct from pure profit-maximization. That is why
Penrose (1995) characterizes firm owners in two categories, which are productminded entrepreneurs and empire builders.
Although this is the main principle in the context of agency theory, its innovation is
the result of a misaligning of interests between Berle and Means, as Berle saw a
project with a new conception of property, contrary to Means who recommend
separation of management from control (Nodoushani and Nodoushani 1999).
Because of asymmetric information due to separation of ownership from control,
highly dispersed stockholders will not be able to evaluate managers’ performance
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Moreover, separation of ownership from control is the
cause of asymmetric information in corporate relationships, which could lead to
different business behaviors. To solve this problem, Leibenstein (1966) suggests
tying managers’ compensation with their performance. However, managerial
performance is more likely to become unsatisfactory when a corporation attains
significant market power (Williamson 1964), or capital market imperfections
develop (Smiley 1976), or managers do not receive ample incentives in their
contracts (Williamson 1985), or when it is difficult to replace managers (Fama
1980).
Compared to the United States of America, Taiwan has family-owned or controlled
corporate enterprises that tend to have a large degree of separation of ownership
from control in the Asian region (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2002). Separation
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of ownership from control in large firms in Taiwan is evident but is often illusionary
because managers may be picked on the basis of loyalty to the family than
competence. In addition, corporate governance structures in Asia are not very well
organized and there is a great risk of minority shareholder rights expropriation
(Claessens and Fan, 2002; Johnson et al. 2000). This can lead to higher profitability
but reduces accountability, which can be attributed to be one of the factor that caused
late 1990s Asian financial crises (Iu and Batten, 2001).
Indeed, separation of ownership and control can lead to an inability to monitor
managerial performance in the context of highly dispersed stockholders (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Thus, a firm can be thought of as a nexus of contracts and the
growth of the corporation could be attained through reduction of transaction costs
(Coase 1937). However, the complexity of corporate relationships leads to
asymmetric information that is why New Institutional Economics argues that the
separation of ownership from control may lead to different business behaviors.
In the present research, we focus on the possibility of growth maximization of the
firm as well as investigate if the interests of managers and owners are misaligned.
Therefore, in the analysis, a managerial growth constraint is incorporated to
anticipate the possible impact of control type on financial crises. Moreover, we
investigate how Taiwan was able to weather the storm of the Asian financial crises in
1997, a problem that others including Wang (2000) have investigated at more
macroeconomic rather than firm level. The remaining paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 incorporates related literature, and in section 3 we present an overview of
corporate governance in Taiwan. Section 4 presents our empirical approach and
discussions. Finally section 5 incorporates conclusion that can be drawn from the
paper.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN
Compared to the U.S.A., Taiwan has a higher degree of family-owned or controlled
large corporate enterprises. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2002) noted that there
tends to be a large degree of separation of management from control within family
firms in the Asian region, especially in Taiwan. This separation of management from
control is evident within the larger firms in Taiwan, exhibiting a similar pattern to
that of the United States, but this separation is often illusionary because managers
may be picked more on the basis of loyalty to the family than due to managerial
competence. Thus, while in the United States, managers may rise due to managerial
competence but have little loyalty to the interests of the corporation, Taiwanese
managers may be more loyal but less managerially competent. In addition, corporate
governance structures in Asia are not very well organized and there is a great risk of
minority shareholder rights expropriation (Claessens and Fan 2002; Johnson et al
2000). This can lead to greater profitability in some respects but it reduces
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accountability, which has been noted as one factor causing the East Asian economic
crisis of the late 1990s (Iu and Batten 2001).
We would expect that there will be differences between management-controlled
firms and owner-controlled firms. Given that members of families tend to exhibit
similar preferences on risk and that family owned businesses may be seen as having
an importance to the family that goes beyond profit considerations, we would expect
that family controlled businesses would engage in practices that would be more risk
averse and thus would lead to reduced profitability in the short run, but greater
likelihood of survival. We do not directly test the profitability question in this paper
but if firms undertake a conservative approach to financing growth this would be
consistent with our hypothesis that owner controlled firms will finance growth out of
profits while manager controlled will use equity and leveraging strategies for firm
growth.
EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Our analysis draws heavily from the results contained in Chen, Kiani, and MadjidSadjadi (2007) wherein they employed data from 300 Taiwanese corporations which
were they obtained from the publications of the Taiwanese Management Securities
Commission volume 20, No.1 2002, and the Review of the Investment Information
No. 12, 2000. In their analysis, Kiani and Madjid-Sadjadi (2007) segregated the
selected Taiwanese firms in various groups using discriminant analysis, and
incorporated managerial resource constraint in the analysis due to Penrose (1995) to
discipline managers. Further, they concluded that control type had significant effect
on the firm growth in Taiwan.
Taiwanese firms are controlled by family relationship. In this context Godajlovic and
Shapiro (2005) maintained that Taiwanese firms are controlled more by family
relationships than would be obvious by merely looking at the extent of holdings by
these individuals. Thus, the control of Taiwanese firms is maintained through
cultural norms and placement in management from the members of the family or
those who are loyal to the family.
The chief hypothesis of interest of this research is whether control type has an impact
(if any) on the growth of the firms as well as if the firm data would be advantageous
to explain the reasons how Taiwan escaped from the 1997 Asian financial crises
whereas other did not. Our results that are based on the results drawn from in Chen,
Kiani and Madjid-Sadjadi (2007) show that because of conservative corporate
structure most Taiwanese corporations are controlled by the owners or the manager
loyal to the family. These firms finance their growth from earned profits rather than
borrowed funds. This is crucial in understanding why Taiwan suffered for less in the
1997 Asian Financial crises that did other economies in the region.
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DISCUSSIONS
Glancey (1998) notes that among entrepreneurs who have not ceded control, larger
firms grow faster than smaller firms and younger firms grow faster than the wellestablished firms. James (1999) suggested that family firms where management and
control are interwoven allow them to have longer time horizons than firms where
management-control is present. In addition, agency costs are reduced, enabling
greater profitability.
Managerial-controlled firms are more likely to exhibit a tendency towards a shorter
time horizon associated with a need to address maximization of the present-value of
the firm via stock price changes (the traditional mechanism for determining profit
maximization of corporations within the neoclassical framework), while family firms
may be more concerned with riskier long-term goals (Harris, Martinez and Ward
1994). At the same time, arguments between family owners may provide a greater
degree of managerial autonomy even with close corporate supervision as managers
align themselves with one faction or another (Davis and Harveston 2001).
Alternatively, when managers see themselves serving the interests of the family, or
when they come from the family itself, this can lead to greater strategy cohesion
compared to non-family firms (Ensley and Pearson 2005).
Most Asian countries that faced the 1997 financial crisis borrowed heavily for
financing their growth because a common reason for sustainability of high growth in
these countries was excessive investment through debt financing without taking into
account the poor returns on these investments (Pomerleano 1998). However, because
of the conservative corporate structure where most firms have a strongly binding
growth constraint, Taiwan was able to weather the storm better than the other East
Asian countries.
CONCLUSION
This paper is an extension to Chen, Kiani and Madjid-Sadjadi (2007) wherein the
empirical validity of the growth hypothesis due to Berle and Means (1935) is
investigated. The analysis includes managers’ resource constraint that impedes the
managers’ actions to deviate from shareholders goals. Therefore, the present research
investigates the reasons that made Taiwan get away from the 1997 Asian financial
crises.
Since most Taiwanese firms are owner controlled or controlled by the managers
loyal to the family, management of these firms finance their growth from the earned
profits. Interestingly, such firms willingly obviate opportunities for risky short term
profits in exchange for steady long term sustainability. Based on these observations,
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we can conclude that most Taiwanese firm did not finance their growth from external
borrowings; Taiwan was saved from the brunt of the 1997 Asian financial crises.
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